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11. Introduction
The debate on endogenous choice of competition modes, viz., price or quantity
competition has gained popularity since the seminal contribution by Singh and Vives (1984)
which established that in a private duopoly choosing quantity (price) contract is the dominant
strategy for both firms when the goods are substitutes (complements). However, studies show
that the private firms co-exist with public firms in several manufacturing and service industries,
such as airlines, railways, steel, automobile, electric power suppliers in the EU, education,
hospital, and banking (see Anderson et al., 1997; Matsumura, 1998). Naturally, the endogeneity
of competition modes got renewed interest in mixed markets. For example, Matsumura and
Ogawa (2012) showed that price contract is the dominant strategy for both public and private
firms regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements. Scrimitore (2013) argued
that quantity (price) can constitute dominant strategy when both firms receive a significantly
high (low) amount of output subsidy. In a unionised mixed market, Choi (2012) found that
while there exists a dominant strategy only for the public firm that chooses price competition;
there is no dominant strategy for a private firm. In a more recent paper, allowing more than
two private firms to compete against one public firm, Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016)
showed that quantity competition arises in equilibrium.
While the above studies add value to the literature, firm’s non-production activities
such as, innovation remained relatively unexplored in this context. Research and development
(R&D) have a well-documented positive impact on growth and productivity of a nation.
Therefore, it comes with no surprise that in mixed markets where both welfare benevolent
public firms and profit oriented private firms compete with each other, allocate a significant
amount of their budget towards innovation. 1 For eg., the British public sectors spent £1.453
1 See Delbono and Denicolló (1993), Nett (1994), Pal and White (1998), Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), Lin and
Ogawa (2005), Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) for some work on R&D in mixed markets.
2billion on biomedical and health research in 1982 and this rose to £3.429 billion in 2012. Private
pharmaceutical industry’s R&D spending in the UK, on the other hand, rose more rapidly –
from £925 million in 1982 to £4.207 billion in 2012. Further statistical evidences2 reveal that
in countries, such as USA, UK and Germany, two-thirds of nation’s total investment comes
from the private sectors and the rest is funded by its competitive rival that are public sectors.3
Motivated by the recent trends in R&D in mixed markets, we consider a mixed market
where both public and private firms invest in cost-reducing R&D. First, we show that choosing
price contract is the dominant strategy for both firms. Next, we argue that the findings that
Cournot profit is strictly higher than Bertrand in standard oligopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) 4
and that the Bertrand profit is strictly higher than Cournot in mixed oligopoly (Ghosh and
Mitra, 2010; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2012; Hirose and Matsumura, 2018), both hold if the
welfare maximising public firm and profit maximising private firm engage in cost reducing
R&D.
Further, we show that the public firm is more innovative than the private firm
regardless of the mode of competition. This result can be related to the literature that considers
R&D competition in a mixed duopoly. By employing a model of free entry Nett (1994) argues
that profit maximising private firm has a greater incentive towards process innovation
compared to a public firm as it shifts a larger amount of its funds to sunk cost to coexist with
an aggressive, non-cooperative public firm. In contrast, using a patent race model, Ishibashi
and Matsumura (2006) show that public firm overspends in R&D from the viewpoint of social
welfare. Bárcena-Ruiz (2008) extended Nett’s (1994) model by considering a different
2 As reported by The Guardian in ‘The government has promised more R&D. Where will the money come from?’
(January 4, 2018).
3 See Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006, pp. 1348) for further interesting examples in R&D competition between
public and private firms.
4 See Cheng (1985), Tanaka (2001a, b), and Tasnádi (2006) who confirm the findings of Singh and Vives (1984)
by extending the analysis to asymmetric oligopolies, general demand and cost conditions and vertical product
differentiation.
3objective function for the public firm by taking the weighed sum of the consumer and producer
surpluses, and shows that the public firms can be more innovative than the private firms. In a
way, our result complements Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) and Bárcena-Ruiz (2008), but
contradicts Nett (1994) by showing that the public firm spends more in R&D than its profit
maximising rival.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
model, Section 3 presents the results. Finally, Section 4 closes the paper with concluding
remarks.
2. The model
We consider an economy with a welfare maximising state-owned public firm (firm 1) and a
profit maximising private firm (firm 2) producing differentiated products. We consider the
representative consumer's utility function as
ܷ൫ݍ௜,ݍ௝൯= ܽ෍ ݍ௜− 12෍ ݍ௜ଶ
௜
− ߠ
௜
෍ ݍ௜ݍ௝+
௜ஷ௝
݉ (1)
where ݉ is the numeraire good and ݍ௜denotes the output of firm i where ,݆݅= 1, 2 and ݅≠ .݆
The parameter ߠ ∈ (−1,1) measures the degree of product differentiation. If 0  the goods
are substitutes and they are complements when 0  . Utility maximisation generates the
inverse demand function .i i jP a q q   The firms produce under decreasing returns5:
  2i i i iC c r q q  
5 The assumption of decreasing returns to scale technologies, which can be motivated by capacity constraints or
scarcity of resources, have been discussed extensively in different contexts (Tirole, 1988). Banker et al. (1994)
show that decreasing returns may prevail in the software industry. Girma and Görg (2002) and Saal et al. (2007)
found constant or decreasing returns in the UK industries. The typical two-digit industries in the US (Basu and
Fernald, 1997), three-digit manufacturing industries in Singapore (Kee, 2002), Broadacre industries in Australia
(Townsend et al., 1998) appear to have decreasing returns to scale.
4where ݎ௜ represents firm i’s investment in cost  c reduction and  0, .c a 6 R&D is
expensive and costs ݇ݎ௜ଶ, where ݇ measures the efficiency of R&D technology. To avoid
analytical complexity and unnecessary complications, we however, normalise ݇ to unity as this
does not add much value to our work. For notational easy we assume ߣ௜≡ ܿ− ݎ௜.
The state-owned public firm maximises the social welfare (SW) which is defined as
the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS):
ܹܵ = ܷ൫ݍ௜,ݍ௝൯− ෍ ௜ܲݍ௜ଶ
௜ୀଵᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ୌ
+ ෍ ( ௜ܲݍ௜− ܥ௜)ଶ
௜ୀଵ
− ෍ ݎ௜
ଶ
ଶ
௜ୀଵᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
୔ୗ
= ܷ൫ݍ௜,ݍ௝൯− ෍ ܥ௜ଶ
௜ୀଵ
− ෍ ݎ௜
ଶ
ଶ
௜ୀଵ
(2)
And, the private firm, maximises its own profit level
ߨଶ = ( ଶܲݍଶ− ܥଶ) − ݎଶଶ (3)
We develop a model of three stage game that unfolds as follows. At stage 1, each firm
simultaneously chooses whether to adopt quantity contract (q) or price contract (p). At stage
2, each firm invests in R&D. At stage 3, firms compete contingent to the decisions made in
stage 1 and maximise their respective profits. We solve the game through backward induction
to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.1 (quantity – quantity) contract
Assume that both firms compete in quantities. Firm 1 maximises (2) with respect to ݍଵ whereas
firm 2 maximises (3) with respect to ݍଶ. Solving the first order conditions ቀ
డௌௐ
డ௤భ
= 0 & డగమ
డ௤మ
=
0ቁwe obtain:
6 The specifications of the cost structure is similar to Gil-Moltó et al. (2011) who analysed the role of R&D
subsidies and Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) who studied the welfare effects of R&D and an output subsidy in the
context of mixed market.
5ݍଵ
௤௤ = (ܽ4 − ߠ) − 4ߣଵ + ߠߣଶ
12 − ߠଶ
(4)
ݍଶ
௤௤ = (ܽ3 − ߠ) + ߠߣଵ− 3ߣଶ
12 − ߠଶ
(5)
Using (4) and (5), firms' objective functions in (2) and (3) reduce to
ܹܵ ௤௤ = 12 (3ݍଵଶ + 2ߠݍଵݍଶ + 5ݍଶଶ) − (ݎଵଶ + ݎଶଶ) (6)
ߨଶ
௤௤ = 2ݍଶଶ− ݎଶଶ (7)
At the R&D stage the public firm and the private firm derive their optimal R&D levels by
maximising (6) and (7) with respect to ݎଵ and ݎଶ respectively.7 We get the equilibrium R&D
spending as:
ݎଵ
௤௤ = (ܽ− )ܿ(42 − 15ߠ− 3ߠଶ + ߠଷ)
210 − 45ߠଶ + 2ߠସ > 0
ݎଶ
௤௤ = 6(ܽ− )ܿ(5 − 2ߠ)
210 − 45ߠଶ + 2ߠସ > 0
Next, we find the equilibrium social welfare and profit of firm 2.
ܹܵ ݍݍ = 2(ܽ− )ܿ2(33840 − 12960ߠ− 9543ߠ2 + 3660ߠ3 + 789ߠ4 − 300ߠ5 − 22ߠ6 + 8ߠ7)2(210 − 45ߠ2 + 2ߠ4)2 > 0 (8)
ߨଶ
௤௤ = 2(ܽ− )ܿଶ(5 − 2ߠ)ଶ(126 − 24ߠଶ + ߠସ)(210 − 45ߠଶ + 2ߠସ)ଶ > 0 (9)
2.2 (price – price) contract
Next, assume that both firms compete in prices. Accordingly, the public firm and private firm
maximise (2) and (3) with respect to ଵܲand ଶܲ respectively. Solving the first-order conditions
ቀ
డௌௐ
డ௉భ
= 0 & డగమ
డ௉మ
= 0ቁ the equilibrium price and quantity can be found as
7 Second order conditions are met,
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6ଵܲ
௣௣ = (ܽ8 − ߠ− 3ߠଶ− ߠଷ + ߠସ) + 2(2 − ߠଶ)ߣଵ + ߠ(1 + ߠଶ)ߣଶ
12 − 5ߠଶ + ߠସ
ଶܲ
௣௣ = (ܽ3 − ߠଶ)(3 − ߠ) + ߠ(3 − ߠଶ)ߣଵ + (3 − 2ߠଶ + ߠସ)ߣଶ
12 − 5ߠଶ + ߠସ
and, ݍଵ௣௣ = (ܽ4 − 2ߠ− ߠଶ + ߠଷ) − (4 − ߠଶ)ߣଵ + ߠ(2 − ߠଶ)ߣଶ12 − 5ߠଶ + ߠସ (10)
ݍଶ
௣௣ = (ܽ3 − ߠ) + ߠߣଵ− 3ߣଶ
12 − 5ߠଶ + ߠସ (11)
Substituting (10) and (11) in (2) and (3), we re-write firms’ objective functions as
ܹܵ ௣௣ = ߟଵݍଵ + 12 (ݍଵଶ + 2ߠݍଵݍଶ + 5ݍଶଶ− 2ߠଶݍଶଶ) − (ݎଵଶ + ݎଶଶ) (12)
ߨଶ
௣௣ = (2 − ߠଶ)ݍଶଶ− ݎଶଶ (13)
where ߟଵ = ௔൫ସାఏିଶఏమିଶఏయାఏర൯ି ൫ସିଶఏమାఏర൯ఒభିఏ൫ଵିଶఏమ൯ఒమଵଶିହఏమାఏర .
Next, the firms decide their optimal R&D levels by maximising (12) and (13) with respect to
ݎଵ and ݎଶ which give:8
ݎଵ
௣௣ = (ܽ− )ܿ(42 − 15ߠ− 32ߠଶ + 10ߠଷ + 13ߠସ− 4ߠହ− 2ߠ଺ + ߠ଻)
210 − 190ߠଶ + 85ߠସ− 18ߠ଺ + 2ߠ଼ > 0
ݎଶ
௣௣ = 3(ܽ− )ܿ(5 − 2ߠ)(2 − ߠଶ)
210 − 190ߠଶ + 85ߠସ− 18ߠ଺ + 2ߠ଼ > 0
Straightforward calculations yield:
ܹܵ ௣௣ = (ܽ− )ܿଶߟ22ቀ210 − 190ߠ2 + 85ߠ4 − 18ߠ6 + 2ߠ8ቁ2 > 0 (14)
ߨଶ
௣௣ = 2(ܽ− )ܿଶ(5 − 2ߠ)ଶ(2 − ߠଶ)(126 − 111ߠଶ + 49ߠସ− 10ߠ଺ + ߠ଼)(210 − 190ߠଶ + 85ߠସ− 18ߠ଺ + 2ߠ଼)ଶ > 0 (15)
8 The second order conditions are satisfied,      
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7where, ߟଶ = ൫33840 − 12960ߠ− 54903ߠ2 + 20460ߠ3 + 45603ߠ4 − 16780ߠ5 − 23488ߠ6 +8720ߠ7 + 7993ߠ8 − 3020ߠ9 − 1809ߠ10 + 708ߠ11 + 254ߠ12 − 104ߠ13 − 18ߠ14 + 8ߠ15൯.
2.3 (price – quantity) contract
Now, suppose that the public firm adopts the price contract whereas the private firm adopts the
quantity contract. Therefore, firm 1 maximises (2) with respect to ଵܲ and firm 2 maximises (3)
with respect to ݍଶ. The first-order conditions ቀడௌௐడ௉భ = 0 & డగమడ௤మ = 0ቁgive
ଵܲ
௣௤ = (ܽ4 − ߠ− ߠଶ) + (2 − ߠଶ)ߣଵ + ߠߣଶ2(3 − ߠଶ) (16)
ݍଶ
௣௤ = (ܽ3 − ߠ) + ߠߣଵ− 3ߣଶ4(3 − ߠଶ) (17)
Using (16) and (17) in (2) and (3) give:
ܹܵ ௣௤ = 12 (3ݍଵଶ + 2ߠݍଵݍଶ + 5ݍଶଶ− 2ߠଶݍଶଶ) − (ݎଵଶ + ݎଶଶ) (18)
ߨଶ
௣௤ = (2 − ߠଶ)ݍଶଶ− ݎଶଶ (19)
Maximising the above with respect to ݎଵ and ݎଶ yield9
ݎଵ
௣௤ = (ܽ− )ܿ(42 − 15ߠ− 24ߠଶ + 7ߠଷ + 3ߠସ)
210 − 150ߠଶ + 29ߠସ > 0
ݎଶ
௣௤ = 3(ܽ− )ܿ(5 − 2ߠ)(2 − ߠଶ)
210 − 150ߠଶ + 29ߠସ > 0
Substituting the above in (18) and (19) gives:
ܹܵ ௣௤ = (ܽ− )ܿଶ(33840 − 12960ߠ− 41583ߠଶ + 15180ߠଷ + 18336ߠସ− 6000ߠହ− 3295ߠ଺ + 812ߠ଻ + 174ߠ଼)2(210 − 150ߠଶ + 29ߠସ)ଶ > 0 (20)
ߨଶ
௣௤ = (ܽ− )ܿଶ(5 − 2ߠ)ଶ(2 − ߠଶ)(126 − 87ߠଶ + 16ߠସ)(210 − 150ߠଶ + 29ߠସ)ଶ > 0 (21)
9 Second order conditions are met,
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82.4 (quantity – price) contract
Finally, assume that the public firm chooses quantity and the private firm chooses price
contract. Firm 1 and firm 2, in this case, maximises (2) and (3) with respect to ݍଵ and ଶܲ
respectively. Solving the first-order conditions ቀడௌௐ
డ௤భ
= 0 & డగమ
డ௉మ
= 0ቁ, we find
ݍଵ
௤௣ = (ܽ2 − ߠ) − 2ߣଵ + ߠߣଶ(6 − ߠଶ) (22)
ଶܲ
௤௣ = 3 (ܽ3 − ߠ) + 3ߠߣଵ− (3 − 2ߠଶ)ߣଶ2(6 − ߠଶ) (23)
Using (6) and (7) in (2) and (3) gives
ܹܵ ௤௣ = ݍଵߟଷ + 12 (ݍଵଶ + 2ߠݍଵݍଶ + 5ݍଶଶ) − (ݎଵଶ + ݎଶଶ) (24)
ߨଶ
௤௣ = 2ݍଶଶ− ݎଶଶ (25)
where ߟଷ = ቀ௔൫ସାఏିఏమ൯ି ൫ସିఏమ൯ఒభିఏఒమଶ(଺ିఏమ) ቁ.
We obtain the equilibrium R&D investments by maximising (24) and (25) with respect to ݎଵ
and ݎଶ respectively.10
ݎଵ
௤௣ = (ܽ− )ܿ(2 − ߠ)(21 + 3ߠ− 4ߠଶ)
210 − 85ߠଶ + 8ߠସ > 0
ݎଶ
௤௣ = 6(ܽ− )ܿ(5 − 2ߠ)
210 − 85ߠଶ + 8ߠସ > 0
Straightforward calculations give
ܹܵ ௤௣ = (ܽ− )ܿଶ(33840 − 12960ߠ− 22863ߠଶ + 8940ߠଷ + 4746ߠସ− 1840ߠହ− 336ߠ଺ + 128ߠ଻)2(210 − 85ߠଶ + 8ߠସ)ଶ > 0 (26)
ߨଶ
௤௣ = 4(ܽ− )ܿଶ(5 − 2ߠ)ଶ(63 − 24ߠଶ + 2ߠସ)(210 − 85ߠଶ + 8ߠସ)ଶ > 0 (27)
The discussions establish the following Lemma.
10 The second order conditions hold,
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9Lemma 1: Assume that 0.  The public firm produces more than the private firm and the
former invests more in R&D than the latter.
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.
■ 
Lemma 1 states that the public firm produces more than the private firm regardless of the mode
of competition, i.e., Cournot or Bertrand. And, investments in R&D being socially desirable,
the public firm also invests more than the private, whereas the private firm simply free-rides
on public firm’s investments.
At this stage, it is worth pointing out that it is not clear a-priori whether the public
firm produces under higher marginal cost than that of a private firm. Straightforward
calculations show that the public firm faces a higher marginal cost of production compared to
a private firm,11 meaning that distributional inefficiency that arises due to cost of production
would have reduced should the last few units of output were produced by the private firm.
3. Results
We now analyse the first stage of the game where the firms decide whether to adopt price or
quantity contract. Table 1 summarises the possible strategies of each firm and the realised profit
of firm 2 and associated welfare.
11 See that   
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Table 1: First stage game
Firm 2
Firm 1
Proposition 1: If 0,  choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for both firms.
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The reasoning of the proposition goes as follows. We begin by assuming that the goods are
substitutes and justify why choosing price contract is the best strategy for the public firm. Note
that, process R&D reduces firm’s unit cost of production which generates more output. This
Quantity Price
Quantity
Price
ܹܵ ݍݍ,ߨ2ݍݍ
ܹܵ ݌ݍ,ߨ2݌ݍ ܹܵ
ݍ݌,ߨ2ݍ݌
ܹܵ ݌݌,ߨ2݌݌
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creates a direct positive effect on social welfare. Second, it is easy to see that the R&D
investments act as strategic substitutes for substitutable products, meaning that investment by
a typical firm reduces its rival’s output thus creating an indirect negative effect on welfare.
Straightforward calculations show that regardless of whether the private firm chooses the price
contract or quantity contract, the public firm always invests more under quantity competition
than price competition when the goods are substitutes.12 This implies that the reduction in rival
firm’s output and hence, the loss in social welfare is also higher under the former competition
than the latter. Therefore, the public firm always favours price contract to minimise the welfare
loss.
We now consider the case where the goods are complements and again explain why
choosing price contract becomes the dominant strategy for the public firm. As cost reduction
in R&D boosts output regardless of the type of goods, the direct positive effect on social
welfare remains even when the goods are complements. Second, we find that R&D investments
act as strategic complements for complementary products. This means an investment by a
typical firm increases its rival’s output which again creates a positive effect on social welfare.
As follows from Lemma 1, the public firm always invests more under price competition than
quantity competition no matter whether the private firm chooses the price or quantity contract.
This means that the rise in rival firm’s output and hence, the gain in social welfare is also higher
under the latter competition than the former. Therefore, it follows naturally that the public firm
chooses price contract to maximise its gain in social welfare.
Next, we discuss why choosing price contract is the best response for the private firm.
Note that, R&D creates two opposing effects on profit. First, for a given cost reduction, higher
12 See that
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12
output breeds larger profit. We call this a positive output effect. Second, R&D activity being
costly, it creates adverse effects on profit. We name this as negative cost effect. We find that
irrespective of whether the public firm adopts the price contract or quantity contract, the private
firm produces and invests more under the Bertrand competition compared to Cournot13 and the
positive output effect always dominates the negative cost effect on profit if the private firm
chooses price competition. This holds true for both substitutable and complementary products.
Hence, the private firm always prefers price contract to quantity contract.
The following results are also worth noting.
Proposition 2: Assume that 0.  The private firm earns a higher profit under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition if 0.92 0.92,   while the opposite holds for
1 0.92    and 0.92 1. 
Proof: It can be checked that    
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It is easy to check that irrespective of the degree of product differentiation, the private firm in
our work, produces more when the competition is in prices than in quantities.14 Further, if
13 Check that
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 0.92,0.92   the private firm’s investment in R&D is also higher in the former competition
than the latter whereas the reverse holds for  1, 0.92    and  0.92,1 .  15 As follows,
when the products are moderately differentiated (i.e., 0.92 0.92   ) meaning that the
product market competition is not so fierce, the benefit from R&D via positive output effect
outweighs the negative cost effect thus giving rise to larger profit under price contract than
quantity contract. The opposite happens when the goods are close to perfect substitutes
 . ., 1i e   or perfect complements  . ., 1i e   resulting in higher profit under Cournot
than Bertrand competition. This result is in sharp contrast with Ghosh and Mitra (2010) and
Matsumura and Ogawa (2012).
Proposition 3: Bertrand competition yields higher social welfare than Cournot competition.
Proof: Check that    
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The result above shows that the level of social welfare is higher under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot. This affirms the results of Singh and Vives (1984) and Ghosh and Mitra
(2010) who show that Bertrand competition yields higher welfare than Cournot in private
oligopoly and mixed oligopoly respectively. The welfare ordering obtained in our model,
however, differs from the one derived by Hirose and Matsumura (2018) who adopt a model of
15 See that
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Stackelberg leadership. Although they find that Bertrand welfare is higher than Cournot
welfare under public leadership, the welfare ranking is not so straightforward when the private
firm is a Stackelberg leader. They show that under private leadership the welfare can be higher
under Cournot competition than Bertrand if the foreign ownership in the private firm is
significantly low. Our results, therefore, show that the standard welfare ranking is more
common even when both public and private firm invest in cost reducing R&D.
4. Conclusion
Over years, the endogenous choice of competition mode has been studied extensively.
However, firm’s non-production activities such as innovation has received relatively less
attention in this context. We revisit the classic discussion of the endogenous choice of price
and quantity contract in a mixed duopoly setting where both public firm and private firm
engage in cost reducing R&D. In contrary to the traditional belief that quantity competition
constitutes equilibrium, we show that price competition arises in equilibrium. Further, we find
that the private firm accrues higher profit under Cournot competition than Bertrand when the
goods are close to perfect substitutes or perfect complements. We also show that the public
firm spends more towards R&D compared to the private firm where the latter chooses to free
ride on public firm’s investments in innovation. Our results indicate that when the state-owned
public firm compete in prices with its rival, it should engage in R&D more actively compared
to when it competes in quantity as the overall welfare improves under the former competition
mode. To this end, our results offer valuable insights on firms’ R&D strategies and
policymakers’ take on privatisation.
Finally, in spirit of the present paper we remark on the areas that remained unexplored.
First, our paper nests on the assumption that both welfare maximising public firm and profit
maximising private firm invest only in costs-reducing R&D. However, firms typically finance
15
in both product and process innovation and therefore, it would be interesting to check how our
results change in such cases. Second, it would be interesting to see the effect of competition on
firms’ R&D efforts. To this end it is natural to assume that there could be a large number of
private firms that allocate their budget towards R&D and compete against a nationalised firm.
Third, the literature in mixed oligopoly predominantly assume that both public and private
firms operate and compete in the same country. Our model made no exception to this
assumption. However, with the wave of globalisation where foreign competition plays a pivotal
role, one may want to explore how a public firm or private firm that is based in a foreign land
and invests in process R&D will affect our findings. Another natural extension could be to
explore the case of licensing where one of the firms (either private or public firm) that possesses
a superior technology may choose to licence it to its rival. It would be equally intriguing to
look into the situation where one of the firms is partially privatised as opposed to fully
privatised firm. As these issues deserve a detailed analysis, we leave them for future research.
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